





This paper describes the neo-institutional approaches of transaction cost
economics, agency theory, and property rights analysis and summarizes efforts by
economists to apply these concepts to cooperatives. Several problems intrinsic to the
cooperative organizational form and its property rights structure are reviewed. These
problems have been hypothesized to affect the comparative economic efficiency of
cooperative firms and have led to the development of life cycle models seeking to
explain the formation, growth, and eventual decline of cooperatives as markets evolve.
In this context, statistical analyses of the comparative efficiency of cooperatives and ex
post studies of cooperative conversions are surveyed.
During the past quarter century, cooperatives in this country, as well as worldwide,
have undertaken substantial structural changes in an effort to adjust to a rapidly changing
economic environment characterized by increasing globalization and agricultural
industrialization. In addition to horizontal and vertical restructuring in the form of
mergers, consolidations, and acquisitions, cooperatives have become increasingly
involved in fundamental institutional changes by which some have converted to investor-
owned stock corporations. Others have formed hybrid organizations that have taken on
some of the characteristics of corporations while seeking to maintain a cooperative
character. Alternatively, many have sought external sources of equity capital by forming
publicly held subsidiaries or by entering into joint ventures with corporations.
The increasing frequency with which this institutional reorganization has taken place
has led to the perception that there may be fundamental features intrinsic to the
cooperative organizational form that restrict cooperatives from being able to compete
effectively in an increasingly complex economy and that ultimately threaten their long-
term survival. Concurrent with the restructuring of cooperatives, and the economy at
large, economists have been developing new methods for analyzing organizational forms
and their relationships within the market system. Three distinct but related methods that
have been developed are transaction cost economics, agency theory, and property rights
analysis. Collectively, these three areas of economics have been referred to by some
economists as "neo-institutional economics" because they focus on institutions and
institutional constraints rather than the profit-maximizing behavior of abstract firms in
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the neoclassical economic paradigm, Appropriately, much of the recent analysis of the
cooperative organizational form has been based on these tools.
This paper describes the neo-institutional approaches of transaction cost economics,
agency theory, and property rights analysis and summarizes some of the recent efforts of
economists to apply neo-institutional concepts to analysis of the cooperative
organizational form. There is little in this paper that is original. Its intended contribution
is the integration of material from many sources and the evaluation of the usefulness of
neo-institutional paradigms for analyzing cooperatives. The paper concludes that neo-
institutional methods are extremely useful for studying the organizational strategies of
cooperatives, that those analyses that have applied these approaches to the cooperative
organizational form have provided valuable insights, but that much work still needs to be
conducted,
'Neo-Institutional Paradigms'
According to the neoclassical theory of the firm, each firm maximizes its profits given
its cost structure and the demand for its products. Hypotheses concerning the behavior
of the firm are generated by identifying the variables in the firm's profit function and
analyzing how changes in the firm's constraints affect its set of opportunities. The
assumptions of the neoclassical theory include transaction costs are zero (i.e., the costs of
obtaining information about alternatives and the costs of negotiating, monitoring, and
enforcing contracts are zero), adjustment costs are zero, all resources are fully allocated
and privately held, and owners allocate resources among uses purely in response to
pecuniary incentives.
Dissatisfaction with the neoclassical theory of the firm began with the assertion that
firms maximize profits and therefore operate at least cost. In the late I950s, economists
began constructing alternative models of the firm based on other assumptions, including
maximization of the rate of growth, sales, and firm size subject to some sort of a profit
constraint. A second approach to correcting the deficiencies of the neoclassical theory
rejected maximizing behavior altogether and focused on the process of decision making
within the firm. Key concepts in this approach included satisficing, multiple goals,
organizational slack, and other behavioral characteristics of the firm. Although these
approaches did not provide a unified framework for replacing the neoclassical theory,
they helped to identify some of the limitations of the theory and to stimulate its revision.
A third approach has sought to generalize the neoclassical model by eliminating some
of the conditions of the model that do not always hold and that can be expected to yield
unrealistic implications. Under this approach, economists have taken nonpecuniary
sources of utility into consideration, have explored the consequences of alternative
property rights structures, and have examined the implications of positive transaction
and information costs, creating opportunities for a major revision of neoclassical theory.
Important steps in generalizing the neoclassical model include: (1) eliminating the
dichotomy between consumer theory and the theory of the firm by extending the concept
of utility maximization to all individual choices, including those made by business
managers and government employees; (2) broadening the limits on individual choices to
include institutional constraints such as the system of property rights; and (3)
incorporating transaction and adjustment costs.
The existence of positive transaction costs introduces new efficiency solutions and
suggests that some property rights may not be fully assigned, fully enforced, or priced.
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different incentive structures, consideration of alternatives to private ownership of
resources implies different behavior in terms of input use and production.
These generalizations of the neoclassical assumptions about transaction costs and
property rights have provided economists new insights into the existence of firms, the
evolution of alternative forms of business organization, and the choice of organizational
form. Within this framework, organizational forms are viewed as developing as a means
for minimizing both the costs of production and exchange. In turn, transaction cost
economics, agency theory, and property rights analysis have been developed by
economists to analyze various aspects of firm organization. Although they analyze firm
organization from different perspectives and are sometimes based on different
assumptions, they are similar in that they focus on institutional arrangements and
constraints.
Transaction cost economics, agency theory, and property rights analysis have been
collectively referred to as "a new institutional" or "neo-institutional" economics by some
writers (Vitaliano 1983, Cook 1995, and Nilsson and van Dijk 1997). As Nilsson and
van Dijk observe, transaction cost economics and other neo-institutional approaches
provide heuristic models for guiding thought rather than providing theories, in the strict
sense, from which hypotheses can be deducted for econometric testing. In the following
sections, each of these neo-institutional approaches to the theory of the firm-transaction
cost economics, agency theory, and property rights analysis-are described and some of
their important concepts and hypotheses are summarized. In later sections, many of
these concepts are applied to analyzing the organizational problems of cooperatives and
assessing the potential for cooperatives to compete and survive.
Transaction Cost Economics
Transaction costs are the costs of organizing and transacting exchanges. They include
the costs of negotiating and enforCing contracts, and they arise when the possibility exists
for one or more parties in a transaction to behave opportunistically, i.e., to seek private
gain at the expense of the common good. Transaction costs include both the costs
associated with the adverse consequences of opportunistic behavior and the costs of
trying to prevent it.
The concept of transaction costs was first described in Coase's (1937) classic paper on
"The Nature of the Firm." Other important contributions to transaction cost economics
include works by Williamson (1975, 1985) and Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978).
Coase sought to explain why so much economic activity occurs within formal
organizations, or firms, if, as economists so commonly argue, markets are such powerful
and effective mechanisms for allocating scarce resources. Coase's explanation was cast in
terms of the inefficiencies of transacting in a world of imperfect information. Essentially,
when the transactions costs of market exchange are high, it may be less costly to
coordinate production within a firm instead of a market.
Contracts play an important role in transaction cost analysis because the existence of a
contract enables the parties involved in an exchange to fulfill their obligations
sequentially by protecting them from opportunistic behavior, thereby lowering the costs
of the transaction. However, not all contracts are equally effective. The ability of a
contract to facilitate exchange depends on the "completeness" of the contract and the
relevant body of contract law. A complete contract eliminates opportunistic behavior by
stipulating each party's rights and responsibilities for every conceivable contingency that
might arise during the course of the transaction. To design a complete contract, the
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actions each must take in response. They must also be able to measure performance and
to agree on what constitutes satisfactory performance, and the contract must be
enforceable. The severity of these requirements quite often leads to "incomplete"
contracting.
An incomplete contract is a contract in which the rights, responsibilities, and actions of
the parties involved are not fully specified. Incomplete contracts involve some degree of
open-endedness or ambiguity and arise because the parties cannot anticipate all possible
contingencies or are unable to specify the performance obligations exactly. Three factors
can contribute to incomplete contracting: bounded rationality, difficulties in specifying
or measuring performance, and asymmetric information. Bounded rationality refers to
the limits on the capacity of individuals to process information, deal with complexity,
and pursue rational aims. Asymmetric information exists when the parties do not have
equal access to all information relevant to the contract and may result from either hidden
information or hidden action. Hidden information is information about the conditions of
the contract that is held by one party but that other parties do not hold or cannot learn.
A hidden action is an action taken by one party that affects contract performance but
cannot be observed or verified by other parties.
Hidden information and hidden action relate respectively to the problems of adverse
selection and moral hazard. Adverse selection is a term that originated in the insurance
industry, where it refers to the adverse effect the self-selection of individuals with hidden
information on their situations has on the cost of providing insurance. Milgrom and
Roberts (1992) describe the adverse selection problem that would arise if an insurance
company were to issue a health insurance policy that offered complete coverage of the
medical costs associated with pregnancy and child delivery. The insurance company
could expect a disproportionately high number of individuals with plans to bear children
in the near future to purchase the policy. Because childbearing plans are privately known
and an unobserved characteristic of insurance buyers, the company would be unable to
prevent this adverse selection problem, and the costs of providing the policy could be
expected to increase substantially. The moral hazard concept is associated with hidden
action and also originated in the insurance industry, where it is used to describe the
changes in individual behavior, particularly risk taking, that might arise due to insurance
coverage. For example, individuals with auto theft insurance may be more careless about
locking their cars than if they did not have insurance (Besanko, Dranove, and Shanley
1996).
Both adverse selection and moral hazard have come to take on broader meanings in
the transaction cost literature. Adverse selection generally refers to any circumstance in
which one party has hidden information about intrinsic characteristics, such as
preferences, technology, and risk, that could be relevant to contract performance.
Likewise, moral hazard refers to a wide variety of circumstances in which parties can take
actions that cannot be verified and therefore cannot be included in a contract.
The existence of a well-developed body of contract law can help prevent some of the
problems of opportunism that can arise under incomplete contracting by specifying a set
of standard provisions applicable to broad classes of transactions and by eliminating the
need for parties to specify these provisions in every transaction. However, contract law is
an imperfect substitute for complete contracting because the broad language of contract
law is subject to differing interpretations when applied to specific transactions and
because litigation to resolve contractual disputes can be costly. Consequently, incomplete
contracting will inevitably result in opportunism and transaction costs.48 Journal of Cooperatives 1999
Much of transaction cost analysis focuses on the opportunism that can be associated
with relationship-specific assets. A relationship-specific asset is an asset that is purchased
in support of a specific transaction. Asset specificity can take at least four different forms:
site specificity, physical asset specificity, dedicated assets, and human asset specificity.
Site specificity involves assets that are located nearby to economize on transportation or
inventory costs or to achieve processing efficiencies. Physical asset specificity is associated
with assets with physical properties specifically tailored to a particular transaction.
Dedicated assets are assets in which an investment is made on the basis of a promise of a
particular customer's business and, without which, would not be profitable. Human
asset specificity refers to acquired skills and knowledge of a group of workers that are
more valuable within a particular relationship than outside it and that may interfere with
a conversion to another relationship.
Generally, the owner of a relationship-specific asset cannot redeploy the asset in
support of another transaction without incurring some loss in its productivity or some
cost in adapting it to another use. As a consequence, when a transaction involves
relationship-specific assets, the parties in the transaction cannot abandon the relationship
and seek other trading partners costlessly.
The need to invest in relationship-specific assets creates what Williamson (1985) calls
a fundamental transformation in the relationship. Before investments in relationship-
specific assets are made, a party may have many alternative trading partners, which
enables competitive bidding. However, once the relationship-specific investments have
been made, the parties may have few, if any, alternative trading partners and competitive
bidding is no longer possible. The fundamental transformation leads to the creation of
quasi-rents, which, in turn, can lead to opportunistic behavior.
A quasi-rent is the portion of a relationship-specific asset's earnings in excess of the
minimum required to keep the owner from exiting the relationship once the investment
has been made. In other words, a quasi-rent is the difference between the revenue the
owner of the asset actually receives and the revenue the owner must receive to be
induced not to exit. Generally, to be induced not to exit, the owner of a relationship-
specific asset must receive revenue sufficient to cover the sum of the earnings of the asset
in its next-best use (its ex post opportunity cost) and the variable costs of production. A
quasi-rent differs from a rent in that a rent is the difference between the revenues the
owner of a relationship-specific asset would receive under the terms of a contract and the
revenues the owner must receive to induce it to invest in the asset. To be induced to
invest in a relationship-specific asset, the owner generally must receive revenue adequate
for covering the sum of the annualized cost of the asset (its ex ante opportunity cost) and
the variable costs ofproduction.
A quasi-rent may exist even if there is no rent. When there are alternative suppliers of
the relationship-specific asset, competitive bidding for the contract may drive the rent to
zero. However, once the investment in the relationship-specific asset has been made, the
asset's opportunity cost will drop because its value in its next-best use will be less than its
value in its current use. As a result, a quasi-rent will be created.
Even when there is a competitive ex ante contracting environment, the existence of
quasi-rent encourages opportunistic behavior by the buyer and seller. A seller, knowing
that a buyer is dependent upon the relationship for its supply, may attempt to exploit the
buyer by claiming production costs have increased and by demanding an upward
renegotiation of the price. Similarly, a buyer, realizing that a seller has limited
opportunities for redeploying a relationship-specific asset, may seek more favorable terms
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opportunistic behavior known as the holdup problem that arises when one party in a
contractual relationship seeks to exploit the other party's vulnerability due to
relationship-specific assets. A characteristic of the holdup problem is the redistribution
of quasi-rents through either contract renegotiation or unilateral actions that benefit one
party at the expense of the other.
The classic example of the holdup problem, described by Klein, Crawford, and
Alchian (1978), involves the dies used to form steel into the specific shapes necessary for
the body of a particular automobile. Although the dies are very expensive, costing
millions of dollars, they are essentially worthless if not used for the purpose for which
they were designed. Ifthe dies are purchased and owned by an outside part supplier, the
supplier will be vulnerable to holdup by the automobile manufacturer. Because the
original contract will probably be incomplete, it is likely that, once the investment in the
dies has been made, situations will arise that will require the parties to negotiate the
nature and terms of their future interactions. Such ex post bargaining may allow the
manufacturer to exploit the fact that the dies have no alternative uses to force a price
reduction. This would enable the manufacturer to gain some of the returns to the
investment that otherwise would have gone to the supplier and that had motivated the
supplier to make the investment in the first place. As a result of the holdup, the supplier
may no longer be willing to purchase relationship-specific assets or may begin to invest in
measures designed to protect it from the threat of future'holdups. Consequently, it is
typically the auto manufacturer that owns the dies.
The holdup problem can increase the costs of transacting with other parties by
necessitating more difficult contract negotiations and more frequent renegotiations,
encouraging investments to improve ex post bargaining positions, and discouraging
investment in relationship-specific assets. To avoid these inefficiencies, firms may choose
vertical integration as an alternative to market exchanges.
More generally, an important premise of transaction cost economics is that the
important dimensions of an individual transaction can be identified, and they can be
used to determine the most efficient institutional arrangement for conducting the
transaction. Essentially, a firm should select the institutional arrangement that minimizes
the sum of its production and transaction costs. Williamson (1985) argues that three
characteristics of a transaction are critically important in determining the optimal
institutional arrangement: frequency, uncertainty, and, especially, asset specificity.
Each of these characteristics is expected to favor the adoption of an internal
mechanism for coordinating the transaction instead of relying on market exchanges.
Higher levels of uncertainty and greater degrees of asset specificity, particularly in
combination, are expected to create a more complex contracting environment and a
greater need for post-contractual adjustments. Consequently, a hierarchical relationship,
in which one party has control over both sides of a transaction, is expected to resolve
potential disputes more efficiently than a market relationship. Frequency of transaction
is also an important determinant because the fixed costs of creating a nonmarket
institutional arrangement are averaged out over more transactions, the more often the
transaction occurs.
Agency Theory
Agency theory concerns the problems of agency relationships, which exist whenever
one individual, called the agent, acts on behalf of another, called the principal. Generally,
the principal owns an asset and employs an agent to increase its value. Because the50 journal of Cooperatives 1999
objectives of the agent generally are not identical to those of the principal, the agent may
not always best represent the interests of the principal.
The concepts of the agency relationship and the principal-agent problem appeared in
The Modem Corporation and Private Property, in which Berle and Means (1932) argued
that separation of ownership and control could lead managers to pursue their own
objectives at the expense of the owners. Important contributions to analyzing agency
problems include Ross (1973), Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama (1980), and Fama and
Jensen (1983).
The terms of an agency relationship generally are defined in a contract that specifies
the compensation to be paid by the principal to the agent conditional on the execution of
specific actions by the agent and/or the observation of particular outcomes by the
principal. Contracts can be either explicit, in which the terms are written and legally
enforced, or implicit, in which the terms are generally understood and enforced by
reputation effects and the desire to maintain long-term relationships.
Problems in the principal-agent relationship due to diverse objectives could be
eliminated if the principal and agent were able to agree on a contract that would bind the
agent to act in the principal's interests. However, because contracts are generally
incomplete, there are opportunities for shirking due to moral hazard and imperfect
observability. Consequently, the primary focus of agency theory is on incentive and
measurement problems, and, whereas the basic unit of analysis in transaction cost
economics is the transaction, in agency theory it is the individual (Mahoney 1992).
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that if managers own only a share of a company's
equity, they will overindulge in perquisites because they receive all the benefits of the
perquisites while bearing only some of the costs. Jensen and Meckling then analyze
which ownership and capital structures can be used to lower agency costs. For example,
they contend that when managers need external financing for capital investments, they
will rely more heavily on debt financing than equity financing because it allows them to
maintain a higher proportion of the firm's equity and it provides them an incentive not to
consume excess perquisites. Since Jensen and Meckling, much of agency theory has built
upon their insights by describing different types of agency costs and other methods by
which those costs can be mitigated.
A major focus of the agency theory literature has been the emergence and
performance of complex economic organizations in which ownership and control are
separated and how the problems caused by this separation can be mitigated through the
design of the firm's capital structure and the compensation of managers. From an agency
theory perspective, an organization can be viewed as a "nexus of contracts" between
individual economic agents who supply resources to a productive activity in exchange for
various claims on the cash flows generated by the activity (Fama 1980). According to
Fama and Jensen (1983), the emergence of complex organizations can be attributed to
the advantages of having management and risk-bearing services provided by agents who
are knowledgeable and skilled in these activities. Managers provide decision-making
services to the organization in exchange for fixed claims on its cash flow and do not
directly bear the financial risks of their decisions. Other individuals provide capital
resources to the organization and accept its financial risks in exchange for the "residual
claims" on the cash flow, i.e., the difference between the organization's income and the
fixed claims. Contracts specify the nature of the residual claims and the allocation of the
decision process among the individuals in the organization.
Fama and Jensen relate the performance of these organizations to the tendencies for
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residual claims and the operation of mechanisms that arise within these organizations to
constrain such behavior. They also argue that when residual risk bearing is separated
from decision management (the initiation and implementation of decisions), decision
systems will evolve to separate decision management from decision control (the
ratification and monitoring of decisions). In complex corporations, in which residual
claims are represented by transferable shares, decision control is exercised both by a
board of directors and the operation of a market for the organization's stock. According
to Fama and Jensen, stock prices are signals that summarize the implications of the
organization's decisions for current and future cash flows, and they place pressure on the
managers to direct the decision process toward the interests of the residual claimants.
This decision control mechanism is enhanced by the existence of stock analysts and the
ability of stockholders to consolidate voting power through proxy fights and corporate
takeovers.
Property Rights Analysis
Under the assumptions of the neoclassical model, property is privately held and
property rights are exclusive and voluntarily transferable. Because transaction costs are
assumed to be zero, these property rights can be fully defined, allocated, and enforced
and, regardless of their initial assignments, they will be reallocated to those uses in which
they yield the highest value. However, the introduction of positive transaction costs
implies that some rights to resources will not be fully assigned or priced, thereby
reducing an individual's incentive to consider fully all costs and benefits stemming from
his or her decisions. Furthermore, other property rights structures may be chosen
because they provide greater utility or are beneficial to specific groups that possess a
comparative advantage in terms of political power. Different systems of property rights
provide decision makers with different incentive structures, resulting in different
assignments and uses of resources.
Even when property rights are privately held and fully allocated, the existence of
transaction costs implies that there will be shirking and other deviations from the
effiCiency conditions dictated by neoclassical theory. Moreover, if private property rights
are diluted by government regulation or mutual ownership, for example, or replaced by
other institutional arrangements, such as government ownership or worker management,
deviations from. the neoclassical conditions will be even more pronounced. For example,
the critical difference between private and publicly owned firms is that ownership of
public firms is effectively nontransferable. This precludes specialization in ownership
and capitalization of future values into share prices, thereby reducing the incentive for
stockholders to monitor managerial performance. Therefore, managers of publicly owned
firms may have greater opportunity for discretionary behavior than managers of private
firms and are less likely to minimize costs and to produce a variety of outputs.
In an important work, Grossman and Hart (1986) developed a theory of property
rights that provides an alternative to the transaction cost model for analyzing the optimal
institutional arrangements for coordinating transactions.' The theory, which is based on
the importance of asset ownership and control, has been developed further by Hart and
Moore (1990) and Hart (1995). As in transaction cost economics, contracts are
incomplete because it is impossible to specify every possible contingency and an
agreement for every one.' However, in contrast to transaction cost economics, standard
property rights models assume that all bargaining, including bargaining occurring after
investments are made, is efficient. In addition, uncertainty, frequency, and the degree of52 Journal of Cooperatives 1999
asset specificity generally are not included in these models. As a consequence, the
outcomes of the models depend only on how ownership affects initial investments.
In Grossman and Hart's model, the ownership of nonhuman assets is the defining
characteristic of firms-a firm is Simply a set of assets under common ownership. Iftwo
different assets have the same owner, there is a single, integrated firm; if they have
different owners, there are two firms and the dealings between them are market
transactions. Decisions about asset ownership are important because control over assets
gives the owner bargaining power when unforeseen or uncovered contingencies force
parties to negotiate how their relationship should be continued. The owner of an asset
can decide how it should be used and by whom, subject only to the constraints of law
and the obligations implied by specific contracts. Assets become bargaining levers that
influence the terms of new agreements and, hence, the future payoffs from investing in
the relationship.
Grossman and Hart define the residual rights ofcontrol as those rights that the owner of
an asset retains when it grants another party the right to use the asset, and they consist of
all those rights of control that are not explicitly speCified in the contract.
4 Ownership is
transferred when these residual rights of control are sold, fundamentally changing the
legal rights of both parties.
Grossman and Hart's theory analyzes the importance of asset ownership under
incomplete contracting. They observe that if contracts were complete, it would not be
important who owned an asset. A complete contract would specify exactly what actions
should be taken by each party under every possible contingency as well as the
compensation each party would receive. Consequently, it would not matter whether a
firm coordinated transactions internally or externally. However, for reasons already
discussed, contracts may be incomplete.
The theory focuses on two units that can enter into an exchange relationship and
distinguishes between two types of decisions-contractible and noncontractible
decisions. The contractible decisions consist of a pair of verifiable operating decisions.
The noncontractible decisions consist of a pair of unverifiable up-front investments in
relationship-specific assets. The parties negotiate over the operating decisions, but if the
negotiations over a particular operating decision break down, the control over that
decision reverts to the party that holds the residual rights of control over those assets
relevant to the decision.
Grossman and Hart analyze three organizational arrangements:
Nonintegration, in which the units are independent firms, each has control over
its own assets, and each makes its own operating decisions in the absence of a
negotiated contact on those decisions.
Forward integration, in which Unit 1 has control over both operating decisions
by purchasing control over Unit 2's assets.
Backward integration, in which Unit 2 has control over both operating decisions
by purchasing control over Unit l's assets.
Grossman and Hart argue that because asset ownership determines control over the
assets when the units cannot reach an agreement, the form of integration affects the
bargaining power of the two units during the negotiations over the operating decisions,
which, in tum, determines the distribution of the quasi-rents that results from the
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of the quasi-rents influences each unit's incentives to invest in the unverifiable
relationship-specific assets. Those investments determine the total profits or quasi-rents
from the relationship. Consequently, the benefits and costs of each form of integration
depend on the sensitivity of these total profits to each unit's investment in the
relationship-specific assets.
Using this framework, Grossman and Hart argue that the incentives for a unit to make
unverifiable investments are related to the scope of that unit's control of the relationship,
and they conclude that the unit whose investments have the greatest impact on the total
profits should be the unit that is given ownership. For example, forward integration is
optimal if Unit l's investment in relationship-specific assets has a greater impact on
profits than Unit 2's investment. Nonintegration is optimal if the investments of both
units have the same impact on profits.
By focusing on the importance of asset ownership, this theory clarifies the concept of
vertical integration and implies differing degrees of vertical integration, which depend on
the extent to which specialized assets are controlled by one party or the other. This
clarification is especially useful in describing those relationships that seem to fall
somewhere between vertical integration and market exchanges. The focus on asset
ownership also suggests that physical and human asset specificity may have different
implications for the degree of vertical integration. The ownership of specialized human
assets frequently cannot be transferred, unlike that of physical assets. Therefore, one can
expect the optimal degree of vertical integration to be affected by both the degree and
form of asset specificity.
Applications to the Cooperative Organizational Form
Applying concepts from transaction cost economics, Staatz (l987a) examined the
conditions under which farmers benefit from collective action and the conditions under
which that action is likely to assume the form of a cooperative. He observed that many of
the benefits cooperatives have to offer farmers stem from the holdup problem and the
opportunistic behavior associated with asset fixity.
The standard example of the holdup problem in agriculture involves the producers
and processor of a perishable commodity. If an alternative buyer does not exist,
producers may be susceptible to holdup by the processor. Once harvest approaches, the
processor can refuse delivery of the commodity in an effort to force producers to accept a
lower price. Producers, who face having their crops ruined by spoilage, are pressured to
accept the processor's terms. A processor who has made idiosyncratic investments in
plant and equipment geared toward processing the commodity is also susceptible to the
threat of a holdup by the producers if there are no other suppliers. Again, vertical
integration is one solution to the holdup problem. Producers can eliminate or minimize
the possibility of holdups by purchasing the processing plant or by forming a bargaining
association.
According to Staatz, asset fixity and the holdup problem underlie arguments that
cooperatives are necessary to provide farmers market power and to guarantee their access
to markets.' He argues that cooperatives are more likely to arise when assets on both
sides of the market are highly specialized and when product and factor markets are
fragmented, leading to a disparity between the value of an asset in its current use and its
value in alternative uses. He also suggests that cooperatives will tend to be more
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consequences of acting opportunistically toward farmers may be more important because
of the threat ofentry by competing firms.
Staatz observes that the potential for opportunistic appropriation of quasi-rents from
farmers is exacerbated by the risk inherent in agriculture and suggests that cooperatives
may provide farmers some advantages in dealing with risk. He also argues that farmers
may integrate vertically through cooperatives to internalize externalities imposed upon
them by trading partners or to provide themselves goods and services of the nature of a
public good, which no other firm would have an incentive to offer." However, he states
that most of the cost savings he attributes to cooperatives could be achieved by
noncooperative firms owned primarily by farmers.
More recently, Balbach (1998) analyzed the contracts used in the U.S. beet sugar
industry, in which three of the nine processing companies are grower-owned
cooperatives. Only the cooperative processors use contracts under which grower
payments are based on the extractable sugar content of their beets. Because of these
contracts, growers have an incentive to produce higher-quality beets and the cooperatives
have been able to reduce their processing costs. According to Balbach, noncooperative
processors have not adopted extractable-sugar contracts because processors have an
incentive to underreport quality and because the costs to growers of monitoring a
processor's quality measurements are too high. Presumably, these monitoring costs are
lower for cooperative growers because, as owners of the processor, they have greater trust
in the measurements.'
Problems Intrinsic to the Cooperative Organizational Form
The concept of the cooperative as a solution to the holdup problem is widely accepted
by economists. Within that context, much of the work applying neo-institutional
concepts to cooperatives has focused on describing problems inherent in the cooperative
organizational form that create disadvantages for cooperatives and their members.
Important contributions in this area have been made by Vitaliano (1983), Caves and
Petersen (1986), Porter and Scully (1987), and Staatz (1987b). The following list is
taken from Cook (1995). It includes the horizon, portfolio, control, free-rider, and influence
costs problems.
Three of these problems-the horizon, portfolio, and control problems-were
described by Jensen and Meckling (1979) in the context of the labor-managed firm but
are applicable to cooperatives as well. All three relate to the transferability problem that
exists in both labor-managed firms and cooperatives and that stems from the structure of
property rights within these organizations. In a cooperative, the residual claims to the
organization's cash flow usually are distributed to members in the form of patronage
dividends or favorable prices.
H In addition, restrictions generally are placed on the
transfer of the rights to these residual claims, i.e., ownership is limited to members, who
must be producers and active patrons of the cooperative. As a result, the flow of future
residual claims cannot be capitalized into stock values and transferred to investors
through a secondary equity market. This transferability problem creates other problems
for cooperatives that do not exist in corporations, at least to the same extent.
Horizon Problem
The horizon problem arises when an investor's claim on the net cash flow generated
by an asset is expected to terminate before the end of the asset's useful life. As a
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investor is less than the return generated by the asset. The horizon problem occurs in
cooperatives because of the structure of the rights to residual claims. Because residual
claims are distributed to members as current payments, the benefits a member receives
from an investment is limited to the time horizon over which the member expects to
patronize the cooperative.
Differences in investment preferences are expected to arise among subgroups within
the cooperative, based on their respective time horizons, but because of the horizon
problem, cooperatives will tend to underinvest in assets with long-term payoffs,
particularly research and development, marketing, and other intangible assets. The
horizon problem also encourages managers and boards of directors to increase current
payments to members instead of investing in additional assets and to accelerate equity
retirement rather than building the level of equity in the organization. Staatz (1987b)
suggests that the horizon problem can be mitigated by linking membership to the sale of
a member's farm or establishing tradeable delivery rights, in which cases the value of the
cooperatives could be capitalized.
Portfolio Problem
The portfolio problem occurs because cooperative members invest in the cooperative
in proportion to their use and because equity shares in the cooperative generally cannot
be freely purchased or sold. Therefore, members are unable to diversify their individual
investment portfolios according to their personal wealth and preferences for risk taking.
Furthermore, because outside investors, who could diversify the risks of the cooperative,
generally are excluded from investing in a cooperative, members must shoulder these
risks alone. Consequently, members are expected to require higher returns on
cooperative investments and to be more reluctant to invest in new assets than corporate
shareholders. This problem is exacerbated to the degree members' investments in the
cooperative represent a high proportion oftheir off-farm assets and to the extent the risks
associated with the cooperative enterprise are positively correlated with the risks related
to members' own farming activities (Royer 1995).
Control Problem
Principal-agent problems exist to some extent within any organization in which there
is separation of ownership and control. However, there are reasons to expect these
problems are more serious in cooperatives because of the absence of a market for
exchanging equity shares and the lack of equity-based management incentive
mechanisms available to other firms. The inability of cooperative members to trade
equity shares among themselves prevents the concentration of equity in the hands of a
few shareholders, thereby diluting the incentive for individual members or boards of
directors to make difficult decisions concerning innovation, disciplining management, or
initiating management change. The absence of an equity market also deprives members
of a means for monitoring the cooperative's value and evaluating management's
performance. Because cooperatives cannot use equity ownership or purchase options to
compensate or motivate management, they may be at a disadvantage in attracting and
retaining good managers. Harte (1997) contends that the lack of equity incentive
schemes provides managers an incentive to encourage their cooperatives to convert into
corporations.
Requirements that restrict cooperative membership to producers can contribute to the
control problem. The production orientation of cooperative boards of directors
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expands and becomes more oriented toward consumers. Generally, the management
skills that are necessary become broader, and the management team must include more
specialists. Businesses that compete with cooperatives frequently include on their boards
specialists in fields that are important to their operations, such as finance, law,
administration, and accounting. Cooperatives, however, usually are precluded from
building this type ofboard by the restrictions on membership Qamison 1960).
Free-Rider Problem
The free-rider problem is a type of common property problem that emerges when
property rights are not tradeable or are not sufficiently well defined and enforced to
ensure that individuals bear the full cost of their actions or receive the full benefits they
create. Common property problems are frequently called free-rider problems in situations
where it is difficult to exclude individuals who do not pay for consuming the benefits
arising from a resource.
Free-rider problems are frequently associated with cooperatives, and they may occur
either inside or outside the organization. For example, a nonmember producer may
benefit from the terms of trade negotiated by a bargaining association or the value of a
cooperative processing faCility may be capitalized into the resale price of a nearby farm.
Free-rider problems inside a cooperative stem from the fact that the rights to the residual
claims generally are tied to patronage instead of investment. New members usually are
not required to make up-front investments proportionate to their use, and yet they
receive the same rights to residual claims as existing members and they are paid the same
patronage dividend per unit.
The free-rider problem can create differences in preferences among various
subgroups, based on how long they have held their residual claims. However, the
general tendency of the free-rider problem is to encourage decisions that increase cash
flows per member. Because of the dilution of returns to existing members, a disincentive
for investment is created. The free-rider problem can be attenuated by restricting
membership when the effects of decision can be captured fully within the cooperative,
expanding membership when this is not the case, charging new members substantial
entry fees, or adopting a base capital financing plan (Vitaliano 1983).
Influence Costs Problem
According to Cook, if a cooperative engages in a wide variety of activities, diverse
objectives among its members can lead to costly influence activities. Influence costs are
those costs associated with activities in which members or groups within an organization
engage in an attempt to influence the decisions that affect the distribution of wealth or
other benefits within the organization. Influence costs include both the direct costs of
influence activities and the costs of poor decisions caused by influence activities (i.e., the
costs associated with the misallocation of resources due to the successful exercise of
influence). Influence activities are possible only if there is a central authority who
possesses the ability to affect the distribution of costs and benefits among individuals.
The importance of these activities and the resulting costs depends on the procedures that
govern decision making and the degree of homogeneity or conflict in the interests of the
individuals within the organization (Milgrom and Roberts 1990, 1992).
Cook does not present arguments for why cooperatives may have greater influence
costs than other organizations. However, it is likely that the interests of cooperative
members, which are linked to individual farm production activities, are more diverse
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maximizing wealth. Staatz (l987b) suggests that cooperatives may have higher decision
costs than other firms."
Cooperative Life Cycle Models
The existence of these problems has led some authors to hypothesize that, although
cooperatives may initially serve some economic purpose within a market, they eventually
will be forced to exit or reorganize as the market evolves because of inherent weaknesses
attributable to the structure of their property rights. Two authors, Cook (1995) and
Harte (1997), have formalized these ideas in cooperative life cycle models, which seek to
explain the formation, growth, and eventual decline of a cooperative.
Cook's Five-Stage Model
Cook's model of "cooperative genesis, growth, and demise" (p. 1155) based on
transaction and agency costs consists of five stages:
Stage 1: Producers form a cooperative for one of two economic reasons: (1) they
need an institutional mechanism for achieving control over the balance of supply
and demand in a market because of low prices resulting from excess supply or (2)
they need an institutional mechanism for countervailing opportunism and
holdups due to market failure.
Stage 2: According to Cook, a cooperative organized to contend with a market
failure generally can market products or supply farm inputs at more favorable
prices than investor-owned oligopsonists or oligopolists. Consequently, they
usually survive the infancy stage. On the other hand, cooperatives formed
because of excess supply and low prices have little economic impact on the
livelihood of their members and are usually short-lived.
Stage 3: A cooperative that survives Stage 2 generally becomes successful in
remedying or allaying the negative economic effects stemming from the market
failure. In reaction to the cooperative's presence in the market, competitors adjust
their strategic behavior and their prices begin to approach those of the
cooperative. As the difference between the prices of the cooperative and its
competitors decreases, the costs of transacting with the cooperative become
increasingly important to the cooperative's members. Specifically, five problems
intrinsic to the cooperative organizational form come into play. These problems
are the horizon, portfolio, control, free-rider, and influence costs problems.
Stage 4: The decision makers within the cooperative become increasingly aware
of these problems as well as the benefits stemming from the cooperative that
might be lost if it were to discontinue operations. Discussion and analysis of these
tradeoffs, the competitive role of the cooperative, and its sunk-cost investments
lead to a recognition of the long-run strategic options available to the cooperative.
By the end of this stage, the cooperative concludes that its options consist of: (1)
exit, (2) continue, or (3) transition.
Stage 5: The cooperative's leadership chooses from among those strategic
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According to Cook, a cooperative has two alternatives available under the exit option:
(1) liquidate or (2) restructure as an investor-owned stock corporation. He cites Schrader
(1989), who suggests that poorly performing cooperatives generally decide to liquidate or
merge with other cooperatives whereas well-performing cooperatives restructure as
investor-owned stock corporations.
A cooperative that chooses to continue operating tends to be undercapitalized
because of the cooperative structure ofproperty rights. Consequently, such a cooperative
has two alternatives: (1) seek external equity capital without restructuring as an investor-
owned corporation or (2) generate additionaf equity internally by pursuing a strategy
based on proportionality. The cooperative may seek external equity capital by forming
publicly held subsidiaries, joint ventures with other cooperatives or with noncooperative
firms, or limited liability companies with various partners.'o
Under an internal equity acquisition strategy based on proportionality, the
cooperative would be restructured so that governance and the responsibility for financing
the cooperative are maintained in proportion to individual patronage. Cook lists base
capital plans, proportional voting, narrowing product scopes, pooling on a business-unit
basis, and capital provision on a business-unit basis as mechanisms for such a
restructuring. He also mentions the "patron-owned corporation" (POC), defined and
described by Royer (1992). The POC is an organization in which control is held in
proportion to common stock holdings, earnings are distributed in proportion to stock
holdings, retained earnings are not allocated to individual owners, and owners share in
equity appreciation through a secondary equity market.
By the transition option, Cook means conversion to a "new generation" cooperative.
A new generation or "value-added" cooperative, which is described and discussed by
Harris, Stefanson, and Fulton (1996), is characterized by value-added processing
activities and a linkage of producer capital contributions to product delivery rights.
EqUity shares and the associated delivery rights can be traded, and share prices can
appreciate, reflecting the returns members expect to receive over time. These
cooperatives, which share some characteristics with poes, represent an attempt to
correct the problems stemming from the structure of property rights associated with
traditional cooperatives while preserving the cooperative character. An attractive feature
of these organizations is that they are financed in proportion to use.
Despite its advantages, however, the new generation model is not without drawbacks.
The need for significant up-front capital contributions tied to delivery rights establishes
financial barriers to new membership, and, through capital appreciation, initial investors
in these cooperatives may be rewarded on the basis of share holdings instead of use.
Substantial capital appreciation also has created barriers to exit, preventing retiring
producers from liquidating their equity shares and stimulating the creation of leasing
arrangements by which newer members lease deliver rights from older ones. Some new
generation cooperatives facilitate membership by allowing new members to purchase
shares over a period ofseveral years.
Harte's Life Cycle Model
In Harte's (1997) life cycle model, cooperatives are initially useful instruments for
correcting or mitigating market failures. However, as market performance improves, the
need for cooperatives diminishes. According to transaction cost theory, efficient
governance structures can be expected over time to replace inefficient structures in
competitive markets. Thus, to the extent that cooperatives are less efficient than
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corporate form. The progression of the life cycle will depend on the dynamics of the
particular market. Cooperatives would be expected to persist indefinitely only in the case
of chronic market failure.
Harte uses his life cycle model to explain the recent conversion of several Irish dairy
cooperatives to public limited companies, which are the equivalent of corporations or
investor-owned firms. Confirmation of Harte's life cycle hypothesis, applied to these
cooperatives, would depend on demonstrating that the Irish dairy industry is competitive
and would remain so after conversion of the dairy cooperatives to corporations. Harte
reviews the current structure of the Irish market for milk, concluding that there is little
evidence of poor market performance and, therefore, little need for Irish dairy producers
to integrate forward into processing and marketing activities through cooperatives.
Harte's assessment is based on the level of processor concentration, the degree of product
homogeneity and market transparency, and the market power of producers, which has
been enhanced by a milk quota system that increases the barriers to entry for dairy
farming. It is more difficult to evaluate the future performance of the market, particularly
under further weakening of the European agricultural support programs and the
expected rationalization and decline in the number of processors. However, Harte
contends that future competition in the dairy industry would be best assured by the
existence of publicly quoted corporations.II
Statistical Analyses ofCooperative Efficiency
Two types of empirical analyses are relevant to further confirmation of the life cycle
hypotheses: (1) statistical analyses of the comparative efficiency of cooperatives and (2)
ex post studies of cooperative conversions. Studies of the comparative effiCiency of
cooperatives in the dairy industry include Babb and Boynton (1981), Porter and Scully
(1987), Parliament, Lerman, and Fulton (1990), Ferrier and Porter (1991), and
Gentzoglanis (1997). General studies and studies outside the dairy industry include
Hollas and Stansell (1988) on electric utility companies, Venieris (1989) on the Greek
wine industry, Lerman and Parliament (1990) on fruit and vegetable processing firms,
Royer (1991) on thirteen marketing, farm supply, and service industries, including the
dairy industry, and Akridge and Hertel (1992) on grain and farm supply firms.
Of these, the most important has been the Porter and Scully study in terms of its
influence on subsequent analyses and its reliance on neo-institutional economic concepts.
Porter and Scully argue that cooperatives are characterized by the horizon, transferability,
and control problems and that these problems lead to technical, allocative, and scale
inefficiency." According to Porter and Scully, because of the horizon problem,
cooperatives are less likely than other firms to undertake long-term investments,
particularly in intangible assets. This prevents them from choosing the optimal mix of
inputs and results in allocative inefficiency. Cooperatives are also hypothesized to be
technically inefficient because of the transferability problem. Because cooperative stock is
not transferable, cooperatives are unable to rely on stock prices as a barometer of
performance, and because ownership is generally dispersed over many members,
individual members have limited incentives to monitor performance. Consequently,
managers are more likely to shirk and pursue other objectives than cost minimization,
which is necessary for the maximization ofmember benefits. Finally, the control problem
may result in scale inefficiency because of the increasing agency costs that are associated
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Applying a statistical frontier production function approach to data from cooperative
and noncooperative fluid milk processing firms, Porter and Scully concluded that the
cooperative firms were less efficient than the noncooperative firms and that the relative
inefficiency of the cooperatives could be attributed to intrinsic weaknesses in the
property rights structure of the cooperatives instead of the pursuit of alternative objective
functions. Using a linear programming approach and the same data, Ferrier and Porter
(1991) reached similar conclusions.'"
According to Porter and Scully, cooperatives survive, despite their relative
inefficiency, because of favorable tax treatment provided by the Internal Revenue Code,
favorable credit terms provided by the Farm Credit System, and free services provided by
the U.5. Department of Agriculture. Although they acknowledge that the cost of milk
processing by cooperatives may be overstated because cooperatives provide services to
members not offered by noncooperative processors, they argue that this bias is offset by
the fact that cooperatives probably prefer leasing relative to other firms and are likely to
use older facilities, both of which would tend to understate total assets and increase their
estimated effiCiency. They also recognize that the existence of cooperatives may enhance
market performance by mitigating monopsonistic exploitation by processors and that the
vertical integration represented by cooperatives may lower transaction costs. However,
they argue that a redistribution of resources from cooperatives to other dairy processors
would benefit society by increasing output.
Sexton and Iskow (l993a and 1993b) review several of the comparative efficiency
studies already mentioned and conclude that there is no consensus as to whether
cooperatives are less efficient than other firms. Furthermore, they argue that the limited
number and scope of these studies restricts the inferences that can be drawn from them.
They observe that Babb and Boynton (1981) and Parliament, Lerman, and Fulton (1990),
using other analytical techniques, reached conclusions different from those presented in
Porter and Scully and in Ferrier and Porter.
Sexton and Iskow expose several biases in the latter studies that generally tend to
underestimate the efficiency of cooperative organizations. They point out that because
cooperative and noncooperative dairy processors are not uniformly distributed across
states, the use of a national average wage rate affects calculations of allocative efficiency.
They also argue that use of total assets inflates the measure of cooperative capital input
and creates an illusion of technical and allocative inefficiency because cooperatives tend
to hold a high proportion of current assets. Value-added is used as a proxy for physical
output in these studies even though the marketing and promotion costs of creating and
selling value-added products are not included in the studies. Sexton and Iskow contend
that this measure of output makes cooperatives appear to generate less output and to be
technically inefficient because they tend to operate in the low value-added fluid milk
segment of the industry." They also argue that because the high value-added segments of
the industry are less competitive, the value-added in these segments may include
monopoly overcharges.
Sexton and Iskow observe that the dairy industry consists of spatial markets created
by geographically dispersed production and costly transportation and that optimal plant
size is a function of both economies of size and increasing transportation costs.
Cooperatives are more likely to operate small plants because regions with less
concentrated production are more susceptible to monopsony problems and less likely to
be served by profit-maximizing processors. Consequently, because the Porter and Scully
study and the Ferrier and Porter study do not include transportation costs, Sexton andCooperative Organizational Strategies 61
Iskow contend that these studies are biased toward associating scale inefficiency with the
cooperatives.
Sexton and Iskow note that the Babb and Boynton study and the Parliament, Lerman,
and Fulton study of the dairy industry avoid the problems of geographic and product
mix heterogeneity that flaw the studies by Porter and Scully and by Ferrier and Porter.
However, they argue in favor of the formal efficiency concepts and the statistical and
programming models used in the latter studies over the simpler statistical methods used
in other studies. They criticize the use of financial ratio analysis in studies such as
Parliament, Lerman, and Fulton because the ratios generally lack a rigorous foundation in
economic theory and are difficult to interpret precisely. They also argue that ratio values
may be influenced by the favorable public support of cooperatives.'o Finally, they
contend that examining data for only one part of the vertically integrated relationship
between cooperatives and their members can lead to misleading results.
Sexton and lskow call for additional research in this area and suggest that it should
combine the rigorous measures of efficiency employed by Porter and Scully and by
Ferrier and Porter and the careful sample selection procedures used by Babb and Boynton
and by Parliament, Lerman, and Fulton.
Ex PostStudies ofCooperative Conversions
Analysis of the incentives cooperatives have had for converting to corporations and
adopting related forms of business organization is fairly limited and informal. Schrader
(I989) examined the motivations behind the restructuring of six financially successful
cooperatives. Four of the cooperatives had ceased operating as cooperatives during the
previous three years. Three of those cooperatives restructured themselves as investor-
owned stock corporations or became part of a corporation, and the other was acquired by
another cooperative. The two other cooperatives formed corporate subsidiaries and
offered shares of these subsidiaries to the public. Schrader attributed the restructuring to
financial pressures on farmers, a strong market for corporate securities, and the inability
of members to benefit from the appreciation in the value of the cooperatives. He also
noted that in five of the six cases, management believed that growth was essential for the
continued viability of the organizations and that the growth rate was constrained by
internally generated capital.
Collins (I991) studied five of the same cooperatives and extended Schrader's analysis
to consider additional factors external to the cooperatives such as corporate management,
personal portfolio management, and risk. After scrutinizing the public documents
associated with the reorganizations, he concluded that the reasons offered by the
cooperatives were not always credible. He attributed the restructuring to economic
incentives and offered the following four hypotheses:
Equity Access Hypothesis: Managers seeking growth may look to external
sources of eqUity if they want to avoid excessive debt and members are unwilling
to provide additional investments.
Equity Liquidation Hypothesis: Members may have an incentive to liquidate
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C0lJ'0rate Acquisition Hypothesis: Corporations may consider a cooperative to
be an attractive candidate for takeover, particularly if most members have a short
time horizon and the cooperative can be acquired for less than its market value.
Cost-oj-Equity Hypothesis: External equity is less expensive than equity
provided by members.
Collins concluded that, although the evidence was very limited, it provided uniform
support for only one hypothesis, the cost-of-equity hypothesis. He found that the
evidence was inconsistent with the equity access hypothesis and that, although there was
some support in the data for the equity liquidation and corporate acquisition hypotheses,
not all the data supported them.
Using the capital assets pricing model, Collins estimated the systematic risk for the
four cooperatives that issued stock as the result of a conversion, a merger, or the creation
of a publicly held subsidiary. All four stocks exhibited very low levels of systematic risk
whereas an analysis of publicly held agribusiness firms indicated they generally exhibited
average systematic risk. On that basis, Collins concluded that there was an investor
demand component behind the creation of the cooperative stock offerings. In other
words, the cooperatives had an incentive to offer the stocks to the public because
investors considered the stocks to be attractive because of the low systematic risk
associated with them. As a result, the public offerings represented an inexpensive source
ofequity capital for the cooperatives."
Both Jacobson (1992) and Harte (1997) have studied the conversion of Irish dairy
cooperatives into public limited companies, or corporations. These studies are important
because they shed light on the validity of Harte's cooperative life cycle hypothesis.
According to Harte, Kerry Cooperative, the first of the dairy cooperatives to convert to a
corporation, did so for reasons consistent with the equity access hypothesis advanced by
Schrader and Collins.
l
" Although access to additional capital was the primary issue raised
in most of the other conversions, Harte concludes that the need for equity funding was
not the reason for the conversions, consistent with Collins's rejection of the equity access
hypothesis. During the conversions, leverage was relatively low in the Irish dairy sector,
and the cash flows of the cooperatives greatly exceeded the levels necessary for
maintaining capacity.
Jacobson analyzed fifteen Irish dairy cooperatives. Of the fifteen, seven had recently
adopted some sort of corporate structure or had been acquired by corporations. The
remaining eight had continued to operate as cooperatives. Jacobson attributed the
conversion of the cooperatives to constraints on capital growth caused by a failure of the
cooperatives to follow the basic cooperative principles of member ownership and
operation at cost. In all fifteen cooperatives, net earnings had not been allocated to
patrons and most equity was held in unallocated form. In addition, those cooperatives
that operated eqUity retirement programs redeemed only minimal amounts ofequity.
Leaders of the cooperatives that converted to corporations believed that external
equity capital was necessary for pursuing their growth objectives because members were
unwilling to contribute additional capital, a fact that Jacobson associated with the equity
management practices of the cooperatives. Leaders of the organizations that continued to
operate as cooperatives did not perceive that outside capital was required to pursue their
business strategies. Jacobson characterized these cooperatives as placing a higher priority
on paying producers the highest possible price for milk and on servicing member needs
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Another consequence of the equity management practices of the cooperatives was that
a relatively few shares of stock were associated with a substantial amount of net worth.
Outside investors recognized this situation and offered shareholders of two of the
cooperatives bids that induced them to dissolve the organizations.
Conclusions
Without doubt, the neo-institutional paradigms of transaction cost economics, agency
theory, and property rights analysis have proven to be extremely useful tools for
analyzing the cooperative organizational form and its institutional characteristics.
Concepts derived from these approaches have produced a rich set of hypotheses about
cooperative governance and financing as well as the comparative advantages of the
cooperative organizational form and the prospects for its long-term survival in a rapidly
changing economic environment characterized by globalization and agricultural
industrialization.
It is toward this latter issue, the long-term survivability of the cooperative
organizational form, that much of the neo-institutional thinking about cooperatives has
been directed. The principal focus of these efforts seems to have been on uncovering
institutional weaknesses inherent in the cooperative organizational form and on using
these weaknesses to predict economic inefficiencies that will eventually lead to the
decline of individual cooperative firms. In fact, this type of thinking has led both Cook
and Harte to formalize these ideas in life cycle models, which inexorably lead to
dissolution or conversion.
Yet the evidence produced by statistical studies of the comparative efficiency of
cooperatives is far from conclusive. The studies have produced a morass of conflicting
results, and, as Sexton and Iskow have so keenly demonstrated, the most important of
these studies are so riddled with flaws that their results are of little use in formulating
policy toward cooperatives. In addition, the few ex post analyses of why cooperatives
have converted or assumed characteristics of the corporate organizational form are open
to ambiguous interpretations.
More research obviously needs to be conducted. Sexton and Iskow's call for
additional analysis on the comparative efficiency of cooperatives that combines rigorous
measures and methods with careful sample selection procedures is certainly appropriate.
Additional development and application of the methods Collins has pioneered to perform
ex post analyses ofcooperative conversions would also be very useful.
On a more basic level, a perusal of the current neo-institutional literature on
cooperatives suggests that there may be a proclivity among scholars to apply the new and
eXCiting concepts from transaction cost economics, agency theory, and property rights
toward uncovering institutional weaknesses in the cooperative organizational form and
confirming the hypothesis that cooperatives are doomed to inefficiency and failure.
However, as Balbach's analysis of the contracts used in the beet sugar industry suggests,
there may be circumstances under which neo-institutional concepts would predict that
cooperatives are more efficient than other business forms. Certainly, more research
focused on discovering and describing these situations would be valuable.
Applications of the new generation cooperative model imply that there are indeed
situations for which the cooperative organizational form is appropriate once problems
with the property rights structure are eliminated. However, new generation cooperatives
are associated with their own set of problems, including barriers to entry and conflicts
with important cooperative principles. The development of mechanisms for addressing64 Journal of Cooperatives 1999
these issues would be worthwhile, and the neo-institutional paradigms oftransaction cost
economics, agency theory, and property rights analysis may be useful tools for
developing them.
Notes
1. This section draws on several sources, but primarily De Alessi (1983), Besanko, Dranove, and
Shanley (1996), Holmstrom and Roberts (1998), and Bolton and Scharfstein (1998).
2. An important earlier work is Demsetz (1967).
3. This literature on property rights theory (Grossman and Hart 1986, Hart and Moore 1990, and
Hart 1995), as well as the transaction cost economics literature (e.g., Williamson 1985), in which it
is impossible to specify complete contracts, is sometimes referred to as the "incomplete contracts"
literature, as opposed to the "complete contracts" literature (e.g.Jensen and Meckling 1976).
4. This concept of ownership, based on residual rights of control, is distinct from the concept of
ownership used in agency theory, which is based on residual claims (e.g., Fama andJensen 1983).
5. Knoeber and Baumer (1986) examine the contracts of bargaining cooperatives and characterize
them as guaranteeing a market for members by deterring opportunistic behavior by processors and
growers.
6. Cooperatives do not integrate vertically in the sense that they internalize transactions with
members, as Sexton and Iskow (I993a) observe. Sexton and Iskow argue that the cooperative
organizational form allows cooperatives and their members to "harmonize" transactions because of
their common interest-the maximization of payoffs to producer members. In contrast, in
transactions between producers and other handlers, the interests of the producers and the handlers
are inimical to one another.
7. Royer (1995) suggests cooperatives may have an advantage with respect to the adverse
selection problem when selecting growers for contract production.
8. As such, cooperatives are examples of "tied-equity firms," firms in which the residual claims
are contractually tied to a claimant's transactions with the firm instead of capital investments.
9. French et al. (1980) contend that one of the reasons diversified farm supply/marketing
cooperatives have had only limited success in vertical integration is that membership in these
cooperatives consists of a diverse set of producers. This broad range of producer interests makes it
difficult to establish a specialized marketing program because of eqUity problems regarding the
treatment of members who do not produce the commodity. Other cooperatives have encountered
problems when they have sought to promote products (e.g., oleomargarine) that compete with
commodities produced by members (e.g., dairy products) (Royer 1995).
10. There generally is a negative relationship between the extent to which decision-making rights
are assigned to the providers of outside capital and the premium they must receive. Thus,
according to Hendrikse and Veerman (1997), cooperatives are at a disadvantage in competing for
external eqUity capital because of the member control requirement.
1I. In addition to applying his life cycle arguments, Harte reviews transaction cost concepts that
explain the current trend toward less vertical ownership and more vertical coordination. He
reasons that because cooperatives represent a form of vertical integration, explanations for
disintegration of the industrial sector should also predict the dissolution of cooperatives. He also
draws analogies between the "privatization" of the Irish dairy cooperatives, the contemporaneous
privatization of public sector enterprises, and recent management buy-outs without providing a
common economic explanation except that they all represent attempts to minimize agency costs.
Without additional specificity, the suggestion that these phenomena are related is not entirely
convincing.
12. Technical, allocative, and scale efficiency are separable components of overall economic
efficiency. Technical efficiency pertains to the firm's ability to produce the maximum output from
a given set of inputs and is measured relative to a production frontier. Allocative efficiency
concerns the firm's ability to minimize the cost of producing a particular level of output by
selecting the optimal mix of inputs given input prices. Scale efficiency refers to the firm's ability toCooperative Organizational Strategies 65
select the optimal scale of production. See Porter and Scully 0987, 492 and 499-504) or Sexton
and Iskow 0993a, 57-58).
13. Porter and Scully also cite legal, structural, and natural barriers to horizontal and vertical
integration, including section 521 tax treatment, which limits nonmember business to 15 percent.
14. An advantage of this type of nonparametric frontier production model is that little structure is
imposed on the data, i.e., the approach does not require a specific form for the production function
and no distributional assumptions must be made about the error terms. A disadvantage is that the
model attributes all deviations from the frontier to inefficiency (Ferrier and Porter 1991, 161).
15. The Porter and Scully study and the Ferrier and Porter study used data for the fluid milk
processing industry (SIC 2026), which consisted of "establishments primarily engaged in
processing (pasteurizing, homogenizing, vitaminizing, bottling) and distributing fluid milk and
cream, and related products, including cottage cheese."
16. In addition to favorable tax treatment, favorable credit terms, and free services provided by the
U.S. Department of Agriculture mentioned by Porter and Scully, Sexton and Iskow add the limited
immunity from antitrust laws afforded by the Capper-Volstead Act.
17. The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) suggests that stocks with low systematic risk (Le.,
stocks for which the return is independent of the returns to the market) will be attractive to
investors because all nonsystematic risk can be costlessly eliminated by diversification. Therefore,
investors require compensation only for only systematic risk and should be willing to bid up the
price ofa stock without systematic risk until they expect to receive only a riskless rate of return.
18. In addition, according to Harte, conversion of the cooperative to a corporation solved
problems associated with the property rights structure. Employee incentives were increased
through an equity participation plan and the use of stock options, benefits that allowed
management to participate in the rewards of improved performance. The members portfolio
problem also could be eliminated and the horizon problem no longer existed because the
organization could rely on outside investors to provide additional equity.
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